

23 AUG 1972

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TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
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TRENDS

In Communist Propaganda


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TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 14 - 20 AUGUST 1972

Moscow (3258 items)

Vietnam	(8%)	8%
[U.S. Air Strikes	(3%)	2%]
DPRK Liberation Anniversary	(--)	5%
Asian-African Women's	(--)	5%
Conference, Ulan Bator		
Venus 8 Launch	(--)	4%
Indian Independence	(--)	4%
Anniversary		
Crimea Meeting of Soviet	(13%)	4%
Bloc Party Leaders		
Conference of Solidarity	(--)	4%
with Iraq, Baghdad		
China	(5%)	3%

Peking (1304 items)

Domestic Issues	(39%)	39%
Indochina	(19%)	10%
[Vietnam	(8%)	5%]
[Sihanouk PRC Tour	(4%)	1%]
Nonaligned Conference in	(12%)	13%
Guyana		
Canadian External Affairs	(--)	5%
Minister in PRC		
Cameroon Government	(--)	4%
Delegation in PRC		
Congo (Brazzaville)	(--)	3%
National Day		

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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INDOCHINA

Hanoi registered acute displeasure with its big communist allies in NHAN DAN editorials on 17 and 19 August which bitterly assailed policies of "reconciliation" and "compromise" with the United States. Subsequent Vietnamese communist comment also emphasizing Hanoi's resolve to pursue the struggle and its firm refusal to compromise reinforced the impression that the editorials reflected DRV resistance to new pressures to accept a settlement. Reports of optimistic statements by Administration officials on prospects for success in the negotiations have been denounced by Hanoi as "tricks" to help the President's campaign for reelection, and Presidential adviser Kissinger's trip to Saigon has been pictured in the same light.

Hanoi's expression of concern over counsels of compromise coincided with the return home from Paris on the 19th of Le Duc Tho, special adviser to the DRV delegation at the Paris talks, who made the customary stopovers in Moscow and Peking. Moscow took the opportunity to reassure the North Vietnamese of its support, giving Tho the highest-level treatment and strongest pledge of Soviet aid and political support since his stopovers in mid-1971. As usual, Chou En-lai received Tho in Peking, but the Chinese again failed to go beyond the minimum in their treatment of his stopover. Typifying Peking's cautious approach, the Chinese foreign minister made no mention of Vietnam in a speech on the 20th welcoming his Tanzanian counterpart, who himself used the occasion to condemn American intervention in Vietnam and to demand a total U.S. withdrawal.

Resumption of full-scale bombing of the North on 16 August following the clearing of a week of bad weather was reflected in increased DRV protests against alleged attacks on civilian targets, including water conservancy projects. Hanoi has continued, however, to evince optimism regarding the repair of dikes and dams allegedly hit in U.S. bombing raids. In addition to continuing, virtually daily protests over U.S. strikes by the DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman during the past week, a protest at the authoritative level of a foreign ministry statement was triggered by U.S. strikes at Hanoi on the 16th.

HANOI CRITICIZES COMMUNIST ALLIES, PLEDGES NOT TO COMPROMISE

The 17 August NHAN DAN editorial, coming after new talks between Le Duc Tho and Dr. Kissinger and coinciding with Tho's return home

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after stopovers in Moscow and Peking, reads like a strident lecture to Hanoi's big allies against pressuring the North Vietnamese to compromise their basic goals. Taking sharp exception to its allies' policies of detente toward the United States, the editorial warned in effect that these policies might jeopardize the big communist powers' support for the DRV and implied that Hanoi is under pressure from its allies to reduce its military offensive in South Vietnam or perhaps to accept a cease-fire.

The suggestion that support for Hanoi could be jeopardized appeared in a passage describing circumstances in which a communist country might abandon its "internationalist duty"--a term regularly used to characterize aid to Vietnam. NHAN DAN warned that if a socialist country's efforts to carry out peaceful coexistence are aimed only at its own narrow, immediate interests, then "it will not only harm the revolutionary movements of various countries, but in the end will bring to itself incalculable losses and give up its lofty internationalist duty." In what may have been a show of displeasure at the kind of support that has been forthcoming in recent weeks, the editorial also observed pointedly that "the vitality of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism manifests itself first of all in revolutionary deeds, not in empty words."

NHAN DAN concluded its lecture on the perils of "reconciliation" with a passage hinting that Hanoi has been pressured to accept a cease-fire or some other form of military accommodation. Thus the editorial declared that it may be acceptable to make some reconciliation to help "impel" revolutionary forces but that "if out of the narrow interests of one's nation one tries to help the most reactionary forces avert the dangerous blows, just like throwing a lifebuoy to a drowning pirate, that is a cruel reconciliation beneficial to the enemy and not beneficial to the revolution."

The editorial also assessed the effect of triangular big-power relations in enhancing Washington's freedom of maneuver in Vietnam. It charged that the United States is hoping to use "reconciliation toward a number of big powers" to gain a free hand in its actions; and it noted that the Nixon Doctrine conceives of an equilibrium among the big powers and the "division of the main components of the socialist system" as a "shield" to gain freedom of action in checking the national liberation movement, "first of all hurling back the patriotic struggle of the nations of the Indochinese peninsula."

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The NHAN DAN editorial was pegged to the 8-12 August conference of nonaligned nations in Guyana, citing in particular the seating at the conference of the PRG's and Sihanouk's representatives as demonstrating solidarity among third-world countries. Hanoi's demonstrative use of this occasion, which the editorial called an "important international political event of profound significance," served to accentuate a contrast between its satisfaction over third-world support and disillusionment over the policies of its communist allies. The editorial framed the message in stark terms by delivering "a serious warning" to those who are inclined to compromise. Welcoming the independent policies of the nonaligned nations, it asserted that the Guyana conclave "clearly embodied a new trend of the time: the struggle of small nations to shape their own destinies in defiance of all sinister schemes of imperialism and regardless of all rightist tendencies and unprincipled compromises." The "victory of the national liberation movement" and of the Guyana conference, according to the editorial, represents a failure of the Nixon Doctrine and "should serve as a serious warning to those who are departing from the great, all-conquering revolutionary thoughts of the time, and who are pitifully bogging down on the dark muddy road of compromise."

Hanoi evinced its anxiety about the policies of other communist nations in a series of rhetorical questions in the 17 August editorial. In a sharp departure from the DRV's usual proclamations on the inevitability of success for the world revolution, the editorial asked whether the revolutionary forces were indeed triumphing over "imperialism," what force is deciding the course of history, who is the chief enemy of the revolution, and "where lies revolution and where counterrevolution." These questions, the editorial observed, "were easy to answer in the past" but have "become today puzzling questions because of unhealthy tendencies." It lamented that "to make things worse, the perfidious imperialists capitalize on the general confusion to confound wrong and right, black and white." Later the editorial reaffirmed that the world socialist system is the factor deciding the trend of history, but it went on to underline the importance of mutual support among countries to promote the world revolution and sharply etched the alternatives in declaring that

the road of revolution is full of fragrant grass
and flowers. Opportunism is a stinking swamp.
We communists must persist in revolution, and
should not compromise.

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The presence of these sharply polemical injunctions raises the question of whether NHAN DAN's intended audience may include elements in the Hanoi leadership who lean toward heading counsels of compromise evidently coming from Hanoi's allies. But the context and thrust of the injunctions point at Moscow and Peking as the basic sources of concern. The theme of refusal to compromise, pervasive in Hanoi's comment in the wake of the 17 August editorial, was given special emphasis in NHAN DAN's 19 August editorial--marking the 27th anniversary of the August Revolution--in which the counsels of compromise were clearly traced to external sources. The editorial noted that the Vietnamese revolution is "pushing back terrible pressure" not only of U.S. attacks and the blockade and mining, but of "all kinds of none-too-agreeable actions in one way or another exerted by tendencies of compromise from the outside." It affirmed that "to compromise and to behave as a coward will only lead to capitulation, flinching, and accepting a life in slavery, a useless life." And it went on to note that the army and people have "reorganized the fight" in the face of the war escalation and "many-sided pressure from the enemy," adding:

Our posture is very firm and can be reversed by nobody. We are ready to cope with all trials and will only advance, never retreat.

While pledging to pursue the struggle, the 19 August editorial injected an unusually somber note in a lengthy passage stressing the importance of maintaining the "revolutionary offensive spirit" in "adverse conditions or temporary regressions." In this context it again raised the problem of outside pressures:

Opportunism often appears in time of regression and at turning points due to the lack of revolutionary dynamism. The disastrous opportunist tendencies of all shades from outside have not been able to harm this land.

It is not usual for Hanoi's August Revolution anniversary propaganda to dwell upon past reverses, although analyses of the low points in the Vietnamese communists' struggle are standard fare in party discourse. For example, Truong Chinh pointed out in his August 1968 Marx anniversary article that under certain circumstances it had been necessary to shift to the defensive in order to prepare for a new offensive, and this view was echoed by Vo Nguyen Giap in his December 1969 article on the party's military line. The same

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point was made by Le Duan in his lengthy article in February 1970 which, like the current anniversary editorial, dwelt on the significant contributions of unsuccessful uprisings in the 1930's.

The QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial on the 19 August anniversary did not match NHAN DAN's polemical tone but echoed the party paper in its expression of determination. The army paper declared that "only by struggling resolutely and perseveringly, by reaching no unprincipled agreements, and by fearing no sacrifices or hardships can the revolutionary peoples achieve their legitimate interests." The editorial warned that the United States is stepping up air and naval attacks "in coordination with extremely cunning political, diplomatic, and psywar schemes," and it charged Washington with "boasting about its eagerness for peace and its desire to solve the war through negotiations while stepping up the bombings and shelling with a view to forcing our people to accept the conditions they have set forth." At the same time, the army paper struck an optimistic note with the claim that "never before have we had such a sound battle position and such great strength as we now have."

A Liberation Radio editorial on the August Revolution, broadcast on 18 August, also emphasized that victory will come only through struggle. It claimed that past experience demonstrated that "genuine peace in independence and freedom cannot be obtained by begging" and added that "a genuine peace can be achieved only through our people's strength and tenacious, unsubmissive, fighting spirit."

President Nixon's detente diplomacy came under fire in a 21 August NHAN DAN article by Nguyen Huu Chinh, a commentator who frequently discusses the U.S. domestic scene. Chinh derided the President for "bragging" about his "foreign trips" and for suggesting that "he alone" deserved credit for "the detente that is taking place among a number of countries." Expressing Hanoi's view that the Administration's "diplomatic moves" reflect the weakening of "U.S. imperialism," the article added that "in the final analysis the international agreements he has achieved do not have any major practical effect and can in no way change the balance of forces in the world."

In the vein of the polemics against "reconciliation," Chinh also reiterated the charge that U.S. efforts to achieve detente "with some big powers" are aimed at gaining a free hand to cope with the world revolutionary movements and to "bully the small nations."

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And he cautioned, with respect to the President's policy toward relations with communist countries, that

while he walks lightly, he carries a big stick.
How can one forget that the Nixon Administration
has always been the intimate friend of the
dictatorial fascist regimes in Greece, Spain,
and Portugal?

Chinh went beyond earlier Hanoi reaction to the U.S.-Soviet summit when he recalled the President "shedding crocodile tears" over the diary of a "Soviet" girl. He did not indicate the occasion of the President's remarks, but earlier Hanoi comment citing those remarks--as well as other statements the President had made during his USSR visit--had carefully avoided any specific mention of the Soviet Union.

ABSENCE OF SLOGANS Hanoi's concern over the effect of big-power relations on its policies at this juncture may be reflected in the absence thus far of the set of slogans it normally issues to mark the 19 August anniversary and the 2 September DRV National Day. The slogans were publicized during the first week of August in 1970 and 1971 and have customarily appeared no later than 19 August. In addition to routine-level Hanoi and PRG comment on the 19 August event, the NFLSV and PRG have issued a joint appeal marking the two anniversaries this year, and the usual NFLSV/PRG congratulatory message to the DRV leaders has been publicized.

The absence of the slogans may indicate disarray or uncertainty over how to treat the sensitive issue of Hanoi's relations with Moscow and Peking. Last year's slogans included the standard expression of thanks for support from the socialist countries, but perhaps as a result of Hanoi-Peking discord over the Sino-U.S. rapprochement, a passage was inserted calling on the Vietnamese to "uphold the spirit of independence and sovereignty, rely mainly on ourselves." A dramatic change in the slogans three years ago may be relevant background for conjectures as to the reasons for the absence of the slogans this year: They were reduced from a total of 20 or 30 to only eight in August 1969, at a time--two weeks before Ho Chi Minh's death--when there may well have been disarray in Hanoi. That strained international communist relations may have been a factor at that time was suggested by subsequent developments, such as Hanoi's effort to promote a Sino-Soviet accommodation and the meeting in Peking of Premiers Kosygin and Chou as the former was returning from Ho's funeral.

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LE DUC THO SEES KIRILENKO, CHOU ON WAY HOME FROM PARIS

Making his third trip between Hanoi and Paris in as many months, DRV negotiator Le Duc Tho was accorded high-level treatment by both Moscow and Peking during his customary stopovers at those capitals on his way back to Hanoi on 19 August. This trip, which coincided with Hanoi's blistering denunciation of the detente policies being practiced toward the United States by its two big allies, was given greater play by Moscow than any since a year ago. As in the summer of 1971, Tho was received by Brezhnev's deputy, Politburo member Kirilenko, and the substance of their talks was given unusual publicity by Moscow. The Chinese followed their recent practice during his stopover in Peking, where he was again hosted by Politburo member Chang Chun-chiao and had a meeting with Chou En-lai.

In the customary pattern, a representative of the country at which Tho was to make the second stopover was mentioned as present in the host country's announcement on his departure from the first stopover. Thus TASS on the 17th reported that the Chinese charge d'affaires was among those seeing Tho off in Moscow that day. An exception to this pattern occurred in June when no Chinese representative was officially announced as present at Tho's departure from Moscow for Peking, though a VNA service message from Moscow to Hanoi noted that the Chinese ambassador had been present on that occasion.

Following recent practice, Hanoi's coverage of Tho's trip consisted of a single report on the 20th taking note of his stopovers in Moscow and Peking. VNA reported that he had "cordial" talks with both the Soviets and the Chinese, giving no account of the substance. In July 1971 VNA had carried a fuller account, similar to Moscow's then and on the latest occasion.

MOSCOW Moscow reported that during his 16-17 August stopover in the Soviet capital Tho met with Kirilenko and CPSU Secretary Katushev for "friendly and cordial" talks on "the further strengthening of friendship and cooperation" between the USSR and the DRV as well as on "the development of the struggle of the Vietnamese people." According to Moscow's account, Tho said that the Vietnamese people would continue their "military, political, and diplomatic" struggle for "genuine peace" and independence, and he thanked the Soviet Union for its "constant and effective aid." The Soviet side was quoted as expressing support for the Vietnamese people's struggle and for the DRV and PRG proposals for a peaceful

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settlement, and as condemning the U.S. bombing and the "mining and blockade" of DRV ports. The Soviet side pledged to continue providing "economic and military aid and moral and political support" to the Vietnamese people until "the complete victory of their just cause." According to a foreign-language Moscow radio report on 18 August, both Tho and the Soviets made similar remarks at a rally that day marking the conclusion of the USSR's solidarity month which opened on the 20 July anniversary of the 1954 Geneva agreements.

This is the first time Tho has met with a Soviet official as high ranking as Kirilenko since the July 1971 stopover. During several subsequent visits he was received by no official higher than Katushev. (Tho had also met with Kirilenko during a June 1971 stopover. There were no reports that he met any Soviet leaders during a stop in January 1970. During earlier trips he met with Kosygin and once with Maxurov.) The only precedent for Moscow's account giving the substance of Tho's talks with Soviet leaders was at the time of his July 1971 talk with Kirilenko, which was described in terms very similar to the latest report. All the other talks, including those with Kosygin, were described in terms no more specific than that they covered "questions of mutual interests."

PEKING As in his two previous visits, Tho was met at the airport on 18 August by Chang Chun-chiao, who gave a banquet in his honor that evening and saw him off on the 19th. He again met with Chou for what NCNA called "a very cordial and friendly conversation." As at the time of his July stopover en route to Paris, Peking did not characterize the atmosphere of the banquet or indicate what was said at the banquet or during the talk. During his June visit the Chinese quoted Chang and Tho as having toasted "the great victories" of the Vietnamese and the growth in Sino-Vietnamese unity, but even that represented a marked reduction in Peking's expression of support for its ally. During Tho's 27-29 April stopover Chou, who on that occasion hosted the banquet for the visitor, pledged Chinese support "no matter in what form the war is carried out" and denounced U.S. "war escalation." The change in Peking's approach has been consistent with its low posture on the Vietnam question in recent weeks.

Peking's reports on Tho's latest stopover again mentioned the presence of DRV Vice Minister of Foreign Trade Ly Ban, who signed the supplementary aid agreement with the Chinese on 28 June. His protracted stay in China, dating back to his arrival on 3 May, suggests that he may be coordinating aid shipments to Vietnam coming from or through China.

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DRV SCORES ADMINISTRATION FOR OPTIMISTIC STATEMENTS ON TALKS

Hanoi's view that the Administration is escalating U.S. involvement in the Vietnam war and falsely claiming it seeks a negotiated settlement was pressed at length in an article by the military commentator "Chien Thang" (Victor), published in both NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on 18 August.* The article launched its attack by criticizing the Administration for "giving full blast to its propaganda machines" on the occasion of the departure of the last U.S. infantry combat battalion from Vietnam. Chien Thang maintained that the President had no choice but to withdraw U.S. troops after the "bankruptcy" of U.S. strategy in 1968 but that he used U.S. ground forces intensively during the withdrawal period and has now ordered the massive commitment of U.S. air and naval forces. In view of the increased U.S. air and naval involvement, Chien Thang commented, "Nixon's claim about 'ending U.S. involvement' is but a blatant deception."

Chien Thang also accused the President of trying to "fool public opinion" into believing he is following a course of negotiations. The article cited as evidence "rumors" allegedly spread by the White House to the effect that the situation in the talks has never been so good, that the war may end before 20 January 1973, and that the war is likely to be over before the end of September 1972. These statements have been attacked in other Hanoi commentaries, which attributed the one about the war ending in September to Dr. Kissinger.** At another point, Chien Thang also deprecated "Nixon's successive diplomatic moves and the hasty trips of Kissinger, Connally, Rogers, and Agnew to Asia, Europe, and Latin America" which he claimed "have failed to lessen the isolation of the United States and to drum up any more support." In addition to noting continued opposition to the war in such countries as Sweden, India, Mexico, and Uganda, Chien Thang echoed the 17 August NHAN DAN editorial's praise for the nonaligned conference's stand on Indochina and said the conclave had proved that the United States cannot "isolate the Vietnamese revolution."

* Chien Thang's last article, analyzing the course of the communist offensive in South Vietnam, was published in NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on 3 May and is discussed in the 3 May 1972 TRENDS, pages 4-6.

** An article in the 16 August QUAN DOI NHAN DAN cited a French newspaper for the report that Kissinger had told a friend the war would be over before the end of September. See the 16 August 1972 TRENDS, pages 12-13.

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A 19 August Hanoi domestic service commentary, pursuing the attack on "rumors" about negotiations, also decried Kissinger's 16-18 August visit to Saigon. The commentary charged that "at a time when the Nixon Administration is preventing the Paris conference from moving forward through its stubborn stand, it is resorting to all kinds of tricks to make it appear as if there will be important changes at the conference." According to the radio, "Kissinger's recent trip to Saigon constituted one of these perfidious tricks."

The 21 August Nguyen Huu Chinh article also charged the Administration with "trying to sow the illusion that some progress has been made at the Paris conference," and it further asserted that "Nixon and his associates are trying to make some people believe that the U.S. position concerning Vietnam has changed." The Chinh article, like several other commentaries, took note of remarks by Secretary Rogers in an interview published on 20 August. For example, a 21 August article by QUAN DOI NHAN DAN's Commentator quoted Rogers as "declaring shamelessly that negotiation measures to end the war would be worked out within the year" and charged that

Nixon has repeatedly released many false themes of peace. Recently he also ordered his followers to spread the news that there was something new in the contacts with the communists and that the United States was trying to settle the war by September.

PARIS TALKS: U.S. BLAMED FOR LOSS OF PEACE OPPORTUNITIES

VNA's typical summary treatment of the 17 August Paris session brushed lightly over the. Binh's discourse on opportunities for peace allegedly missed in the past. The account duly reflected her major points--that the United States should cease the Vietnamization policy, end its support of the Thieu regime, and respect the aims and nature of the PRG. Without mentioning Democratic Vice Presidential candidate Shriver's charge that President Nixon has passed up opportunities for peace during his term in office,* she declared, according to VNA, that January 1969

* Initial Hanoi treatment of Shriver's remarks is discussed in the 16 August 1972 TRENDS, page 13. The reference on that page to VNA's pickup of his charge on 15 August should have read: "Hanoi radio picked up the charge"

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"was a very good opportunity to end the war, but President Nixon has chosen to 'Vietnamize' the war [and] block and sabotage the Paris conference on Vietnam." The VNA account omitted her recital of other alleged lost opportunities--all occasions when new proposals were offered by the communists: the 10-point solution of May 1969, the eight-point initiative of September 1970, and the seven-point peace plan of July 1971, together with the two-point "clarification" of February 1972. Other Vietnamese communist propaganda, like Mme. Binh, has predictably ignored statements that the opportunity for a settlement in 1968-1969 was signalled by Hanoi's withdrawal of troops from South Vietnam's northern provinces.

VNA was even more cryptic in reporting DRV representative Xuan Thuy's remarks, which were largely a restatement of last week's statement by Nguyen Minh Vy. It omitted completely his lengthy charges of U.S. escalation of the war, which he used to counter U.S. criticism of DRV activities in the South, as well as his list of alleged U.S. attacks on the North during the preceding week. It did report Thuy's brief mention of the lost "opportunities for peace" in the course of his charges of U.S. escalation, which he said surpasses that of "the 1965-1968 period." It also noted the DRV delegate's remarks scorning the President's proposals of 8 May, as well as his criticism of Secretary Rogers' 14 August remark that the United States is withdrawing its troops gradually in order to provide the Thieu regime with every possibility for survival.

In closing, the VNA report as usual dismissed Ambassador Porter's remarks in one sentence, followed by the claim that he "also disclosed the U.S. intention to sabotage the negotiations"--presumably a reference to an exchange at the close of the session over the setting of the date for resumption of the talks. The next meeting was finally scheduled for 24 August.

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DRV MINISTRY ASSAILS STRIKES AT HANOI, CLAIMS DIKES BOMBED

Massive U.S. attacks of 14 and 16 August on Hanoi and Thanh Hoa city, respectively, as well as recent attacks on other cities in the DRV prompted a foreign ministry statement of the 17th. Somewhat more muted in tone than the last previous statement at that level, on the 8th, it charged that such attacks on populous areas, together with bombing of the dike system and water conservancy projects, constitute "a towering crime that the Johnson Administration dared not commit."

Asserting that by such "savage tricks" the Nixon Administration is only revealing its "extremely cruel, aggressive nature" and staining U.S. honor, the statement claimed that U.S. strikes are failing to shake the Vietnamese people's "iron-like determination." The foreign ministry then warned that the Nixon Administration will be held responsible if it continues bombing cities, dams, and dikes and demanded that it honor "the U.S. Government's commitment of October 1968" and stop its bombing and mining activities and "all other acts that encroach on DRV sovereignty and security." The statement concluded with a standard appeal by the government and people of the DRV for support from fraternal socialist countries and "all conscientious people in the United States and in other parts of the world" to help "stay the bloody hands of the U.S. aggressors" and prevent "the recurrence of the Guernica, Coventry, Dresden, Hamburg, and Essen cases."

This theme was further developed in a strongly worded NHAN DAN editorial of 21 August, carried by both Hanoi radio and VNA. Entitled "Let Us Stay Nixon's Bloody Hands," the editorial repeated the reference to the World War II bombing of Coventry, charging that the President has gone further than Hitler by creating "tens of Coventrys" in the North, bombing seaside resorts, and using antipersonnel bombs and poison gas.

The editorial "severely warned" the Nixon Administration that "our retaliatory strength is unlimited" and that the United States will never be able to gain the "position of strength it so desires." Claiming that "perpetrators of crimes must be and are being punished appropriately"--through the downing of U.S. planes and the capture of pilots--the editorial said that continued bombings "have torn to pieces the tricky and deceitful screen that they [the U.S. imperialists] recently set up to mislead public opinion by saying that they were trying to settle the war through negotiations and that the negotiating

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situation has never been so good as now." Finally, claiming that the people of America are organizing to oppose "Nixon the war criminal" despite his forthcoming nomination by the Republican convention, the editorial concluded with standard assertions that the U.S. bombing will never stop the Vietnamese people from fighting for independence and freedom.

The 16 August bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong also prompted Hanoi to broadcast in English to U.S. servicemen on the 20th a "joint statement" attributed to eight captured pilots. Describing themselves as the detained Americans "in Hanoi," the pilots reportedly stressed the futility of such bombing, claiming that it will not serve to break the Vietnamese people's spirit but will only make U.S. withdrawal more difficult. In addition, the broadcast quoted them as saying that the bombing will only risk "the death or capture of many more Americans" and endanger the lives of those already held captive. The statement concluded with an appeal to Congress to end the war and bring the prisoners home, as a first step resuming "serious negotiations" at the Paris conference.

CHARGES OF STRIKES
AT DIKES AND DAMS

VNA on the 20th reported as a "sample" of U.S. strikes at dikes the dropping of six 2,000-pound bombs on the dike in Ha Son village, Ha Trung district of Thanh Hoa Province. Describing this alleged attack of the 17th as "the 38th U.S. air raid on the dikes and other hydraulic works" in the province, the report said that a 40-meter stretch of the dike's surface was destroyed and that hits on its sloping side caused the collapse of another section. In coverage of earlier strikes, VNA on 17 August claimed attacks of the 15th and 16th on dikes and water conservancy works in Thanh Hoa, highlighting a strike of the 16th on a dike associated with the Trung Luong lock in Ha Tinh Province--reportedly the fourth attack on this lock. And the foreign ministry spokesman's statement of the 22d claimed strikes at dike portions within Hai Hung Province.

Despite these claims of continuing U.S. strikes at water conservancy projects, Hanoi maintained last week's tone of optimism regarding the dike situation. Hanoi radio on 20 August reported the awarding of the Ho Chi Minh medal to nine individuals for their "many outstanding achievements in water conservancy work," while a Mandarin-language broadcast on the 21st cited the repair of a number of portions of the dike system damaged by U.S. attacks in Hai Hung, Nam Ha, and Thanh Hoa provinces and other areas. Describing the work accomplished in

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Hai Hung, the latter article claimed that workers and cadres, together with the engineering departments, have "widened and increased the height of the dikes and dams destroyed by U.S. planes . . . to three times their original width and height." And a NHAN DAN editorial on the 22d, entitled "The Entire World Is Struggling To Protect Our Country's Dikes," hailed the "creative ideas and enthusiastic acts" of various individuals and countries in supporting the DRV position. It directed special praise at Cuba's recent proposal to celebrate "Dike Day" on 28 August, and it lauded the resolution recently issued by "several hundred well-known intellectuals and artists in France and other countries" which allegedly asserted that, should the dikes break this summer, President Nixon "will be held as responsible for this destruction as if he had bombed these dikes."

In an apparent effort to demonstrate support for the DRV from foreign countries in the face of alleged attacks on the dikes, VNA reported on the 23d that the Cuban ambassador to the DRV and visiting Cuban officials--including the captains of two Cuban ships "unloading goods at Haiphong port"--aided residents of Hanoi in reinforcing a section of the Red River dike near the city. At this writing, VNA has not, however, picked up an NCNA report of 18 August to the effect that the PRC's ambassador to the DRV, Wang Yu-ping, as well as other embassy staff members had joined Hanoi residents in repairing dikes allegedly damaged in recent U.S. bombing raids. Wang was quoted by NCNA as saying that the staff members were helping repair the dikes "to show their great indignation at and strong condemnation of U.S. imperialism's strikes against dikes, dams, and other water conservancy projects in North Vietnam."

SPOKESMAN'S
STATEMENTS

Emphasis on alleged deliberate U.S. bombing of civilian targets characterized the DRV foreign ministry spokesman's statements of the past

week:

+ Attacks of 17 August on the Thai Binh provincial capital, the suburbs of Hanoi, and Cat Ba Island off Haiphong were highlighted in the statement of the 18th. Specific targets reported hit in Thai Binh's capital included a hospital, part of the university of medicine, and a senior high school. In addition, the statement charged that B-52's "carpet-bombed" areas in Quang Binh Province and the Vinh Linh zone, and U.S. warships "wantonly shelled" coastal areas in Ha Tinh and Quang Binh. Calling the alleged strikes "new proofs of Nixon's obstinacy,"

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the statement claimed that they "further exposed the utter bellicosity and cruelty of the Nixon Administration and its lie that the U.S. does not bomb civilian targets."

+ The "bellicose," "deceitful" nature of the Nixon Administration was further revealed, according to the spokesman's statement of the 19th, in its dispatch of aircraft and warships "to savagely bomb by day and by night population centers, cities, provincial capitals, and district towns while continuing to attack dikes and irrigation works of the DRV." The statement condemned the 19 August bombing of Hai Duong, capital of Hai Hung Province, as well as attacks of the 18th on populated areas in Hoa Binh, Ha Bac, Ha Tay, Hai Hung, Nam Ha, Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh, and Quang Binh provinces and the Vinh Linh zone. It further claimed that B-52's bombed localities in Quang Binh and that U.S. ships shelled coastal areas in Thanh Hoa and Ha Tinh provinces.

+ In a relatively lengthy statement issued on 21 August, the foreign ministry spokesman condemned U.S. "extermination raids" of the 19th and 20th and listed all provinces and cities allegedly hit since 30 July. It claimed that such raids reveal "the U.S. imperialists' extremely cruel and perfidious plot of massacring civilians and razing to the ground every residential quarter and every provincial capital in an attempt to subdue the Vietnamese people." Repeating standard charges that the Nixon Administration is thereby violating its pledge of October 1968 and challenging world public opinion, the statement concluded by declaring that it "must bear full responsibility for its barbarous crimes." The specific strikes which prompted this protest, according to the statement, included those of the 19th at the capital cities of Thai Binh and Hai Hung provinces and of the 20th at Haiphong. Wards in the latter city were said to have been hit by demolition bombs, perforating bombs, and steel-pellet bombs.

+ A statement on the 22d charged the United States with dropping "dozens of perforating bombs" on dike portions in two villages in Thanh Ha district of Hai Hung Province, an area it described as part of the Thai Binh River system. It also claimed that U.S. aircraft bombed and strafed Vinh city and populated areas in Ha Bac, Quang Ninh, Hai Hung, Thai Binh, Hoa Binh, Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh, and Quang Binh provinces and the Vinh Linh zone and that B-52's bombed localities in Quang Binh and Vinh Linh. "Many schools" were cited among the economic and cultural establishments damaged, and numerous civilian casualties were reported.

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+ A statement on the 23d protested alleged U.S. bombings of populated areas in Thai Binh, Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh, and Quang Binh provinces and the Vinh Linh zone. It further charged that B-52's bombed localities in Quang Binh and that U.S. warships "indiscriminately launched artillery attacks" against coastal areas in Nghe An and Ha Tinh provinces.

PLANE DOWNINGS As of 23 August, the total number of planes allegedly downed over the North reached 3,845, as Hanoi during the past week reported the downing of 20 planes and the capture of an unspecified number of "aggressor pilots." One ship was reportedly "set ablaze" on 18 August off the coast of Ha Tinh Province.

The alleged downing of a B-52 over the Vinh Linh area on 21 August marked the 1,700th plane downing claimed for the 4th Military Region, which also includes Quang Binh, Ha Tinh, and Nghe An provinces. The alleged downing appeared to respond to an earlier appeal by the military region command, described in a broadcast by Hanoi radio on 18 August, for local units to launch an emulation movement to achieve a total of 1,700 downed planes "to score achievements to commemorate the August revolution and National Day."

A 22 August QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial in praise of this "brilliant victory," as broadcast by Hanoi radio and VNA on the same day, lauded the people and armed forces serving in the "direct rear of the vast heroic frontline," stressing their coordination, maintenance of vital communications lines, and simultaneous achievements in both economic and defense activities. Citing one means of accomplishing these tasks, the editorial noted that "combatants and compatriots" in the military region have been "allowing youths to serve voluntarily as civilian laborers on the battlefields." It attributed this and other successful policies to the correct leadership of the party's political and military line and of the local party committee. As an illustration of the military region's successes, the editorial claimed that since the April escalation of the war 113 other U.S. aircraft, including six B-52's, have been downed in the region and 45 warships set afire. A NHAN DAN editorial of the 23d in praise of the downing, carried by Hanoi radio, praised the "steel land of Vinh Linh" in similar terms. The editorial stressed the people's ingenuity and skill in fighting against the ever newer weapons and tactics used by the United States and claimed that the region's communications and transportation network continues to function smoothly despite U.S. attacks.

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The occasion of the 27th anniversary of the August revolution and the claimed increase in the number of recent plane downings appear to have prompted a 19 August Hanoi radio commentary hailing the "August armed exploits that are blossoming red throughout both parts of our country." Praising specifically the alleged downing of 23 planes in five days,* including six on the night of 18-19 August, the commentary used the occasion to laud recent achievements of the northern armed forces and to blast the "war-maniac Nixon clique" for escalating attacks on the North. The commentary claimed that, although "the Nixon and Kissinger butchers" may try to force the people of the North to yield by bombing civilian targets, including dikes and water conservancy projects, the people will never renounce the achievements of the August revolution or lose their revolutionary spirit. "The Nixon sadists," said the commentary, "are very stupid." Then, viewing Dien Bien Phu and the "complete defeat" of "Johnson's war of destruction" as steps toward "total victory in the anti-U.S. national salvation undertaking," the article concluded that the United States can never shake the people's determination to fight and win and that the people of "our entire nation" share "the same absolute revolutionary ideology and the same revolutionary offensive spirit."

Acclaim was also given this week to Vinh Phu Province for having downed its 100th plane last week; Hanoi radio on the 17th broadcast President Ton Duc Thang's 16 August letter of commendation to the "compatriots, combatants, and cadres" of the province.

* This achievement was also lauded in a QUAN DOI NHAN DAN commentary of 20 August, aired by Hanoi radio on the same day, which praised the exploits of the northern armed forces and people in opposing "the U.S. skyraiders' perfidious schemes."

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SALT AND DISARMAMENT

SUSLOV DECRIES "POSITIONS OF STRENGTH" STANCE FOR SALT II

The first authoritative public Soviet reaction to the Senate debate on the U.S.-Soviet Interim Agreement on limiting strategic offensive weapons came from CPSU Politburo member Suslov on 23 August, in an address to a joint session of the two Supreme Soviet foreign affairs commissions which unanimously approved the treaties for ratification by the Supreme Soviet Presidium. According to TASS, Suslov complained that "some representatives of the forces of the 'military-industrial complex' continue to entertain illusions about the possibility of trying to speak with the Soviet Union at the forthcoming strategic arms limitation talks 'from positions of strength.'"

Moscow had refrained for almost three weeks from direct comment at any level on the Senate debate sparked on 3 August by Senator Jackson's introduction of his original amendment to the Senate resolution approving the Interim Agreement. Routine news items reported in general terms that "opponents" of the agreement, including Jackson, were trying to block it, and Moscow alluded without detail and without comment to the Defense Department's proposal on a new counterforce/first-strike nuclear warhead. Routine-level comment on these questions, raising the issue of Administration support for the Jackson amendment, first appeared in the central media three days before the Supreme Soviet commissions convened.

JACKSON AMENDMENT The first Soviet comment on the Jackson amendment appeared in an international review in the weekly LIFE ABROAD on the 18th. This was followed by a lengthy discussion of the Senate debate in the Moscow domestic service commentators' roundtable on the 20th. The review in LIFE ABROAD labeled Jackson's original amendment "a virtual ultimatum to the Soviet Union" in view of its demand that the USSR "refrain from modernizing its arms, even those not subject to the limitations, under the threat of a U.S. renunciation of the Interim Agreement and of the treaty to limit ABM systems, which has already been approved by the Senate." Where both the weekly and the roundtable discussions noted that Republican Senate leader Scott was a co-sponsor of the Jackson amendment, one of the roundtable commentators, PRAVDA deputy chief editor Nekrasov, singled out Jackson for criticism. He charged that Jackson was attempting "to sabotage

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the spirit of the agreement" and went on to cite Jackson's statement that "my amendment has the approval of the White House." Both the paper and the discussion program noted that Jackson then altered his amendment, the former citing White House approval for the "compromise amendment" and the latter stating that "the very spirit, the spirit of the demand that the U.S. Government continue the arms race, was kept in the amendment."

On the 22d IZVESTIYA broke its abstinence from comment on the Jackson amendment, saying, according to a TASS summary, that the Interim Agreement "must become law without delay" and that "any procrastination--and this should be clear to anyone--thwarts further practical steps to curtail the nuclear arms race which is hardly in the interests of the United States."

DOD PROPOSAL Commenting on the Defense Department's proposal to develop a new, more accurate and more powerful nuclear warhead, one of the roundtable commentators charged that the "ballyhoo" surrounding the Jackson amendments was in fact related to the Pentagon's intention "to design a new warhead, the so-called second-generation warhead for intercontinental strategic missiles--a warhead which is more accurate and far more powerful than that which it now possesses." LIFE ABROAD, citing U.S. press reports, stated flatly that the "new type of multiple warhead" would have the capability "of destroying missiles based in silo-type launch pads." It went on to assert that Senator Brooke had tried to amend the Senate's resolution approving the Interim Agreement by urging a stipulation prohibiting both sides from "creating a first-strike capability." The paper noted that the Foreign Relations Committee had approved the resolution without any amendments.

SUSLOV SPEECH Suslov praised the SALT accords in standard terms, treating them as a positive consequence of the "consistent" Soviet "peace program" endorsed by the 24th CPSU Congress. He went on to assert that the USSR "did not have to change the nature" of its foreign policy in order to reach the accords. Prefacing his remarks on the U.S. "military-industrial complex," Suslov observed that the "broad" American public welcomed the SALT accords "positively" and that "on the whole" the American political leaders reacted "favorably" to them. However, in a blunt statement directed at the Administration, he declared:

It should be clear to all that proceeding from the interests of its security, the Soviet Union will

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attentively follow the attempts of certain forces in the United States to distort the spirit and letter of the concluded treaty and Interim Agreement and will take into account in its policy the changes that may appear in the position of the American side.

Also addressing the joint session of the foreign affairs commissions, according to TASS, were First Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov and First Deputy Defense Minister Kulikov. TASS reported that Kuznetsov, speaking "on behalf of the Soviet Government," saw reason to hope that because of the "positive" experience of SALT I the further limitation of strategic offensive weapons "will be continued in a constructive spirit and yield concrete results." TASS reported that Kulikov also endorsed the SALT accords but that he "at the same time stressed that the party and government were showing concern for raising the Soviet Union's defense capability."

VENUE FOR SALT II Acknowledging for the first time in Soviet media that Geneva would be the venue for the second round of SALT, the LIFE ABROAD article noted that the Swiss Government had announced its agreement to the site "at the request of the [two] sides."

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MIDDLE EAST

USSR REPLIES TO ARAB CRITICS WITH JABS AT "SOME ARAB LEADERS"

After more than a week of virtual silence, Moscow has begun to respond to outspoken Arab criticism, particularly from the Cairo press, of Soviet policies toward the Arab-Israeli conflict and attitudes toward the Arabs, in what Belgrade's TANJUG on the 19th called "a kind of public polemic" about certain questions being raised in the Arab world. In a sharper tone, Moscow continued to reject the idea that the Soviet Union is interested in seeing the "no war, no peace" situation prevail in the Middle East. It lectured the Arabs on their need for friendship and cooperation with the USSR, suggesting that Israeli and "imperialist" pressures on the Arabs for direct Arab-Israeli negotiations result from Western and Tel Aviv assessments that Egypt "has now seriously weakened itself." The Arab countries were further warned of the dangers of disunity and of intrigues to disrupt Soviet-Arab friendship.

Along with routine attacks on Arab "reactionaries," Moscow has begun to take swipes at "leading sections" in the Arab countries and at the illusions of "some Arab political leaders." Moscow has not acknowledged, much less responded to, several recent press interviews by Egyptian President as-Sadat expressing hope that the USSR understands Egypt's attitude as that of a sincere friend, but also complaining that Moscow failed to take into account the "psychological factor" in its dealings with the Arabs and that it imposed a "certain embargo" on arms, which it supplied only "up to a certain point."

PRESS COMMENT An article in the Soviet weekly NOVOYE VREMYA, not yet available in translation, was viewed by TANJUG on the 18th as Moscow's first reply to Arab criticism addressed to Moscow. According to TANJUG, the weekly rejected assertions about insufficient Soviet military aid to the Arabs and took to task the chief editor of Cairo's AKHBAR AL-YAWM, al-Quddus, and "some of his colleagues" for forgetting the identities of their friends and their enemies. NOVOYE VREMYA's attack was apparently prompted by al-Quddus' 12 August article complaining of Soviet silence on the issue of arms supplies and on the improvement of Moscow-Washington relations. In an article on the 19th, al-Quddus questioned Soviet sincerity with regard to its treaty obligations to Egypt. Moscow frequently cited the treaty as the basis of developing Soviet-Egyptian relations in

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its defensive propaganda immediately following the ouster of its military personnel from Egypt, but more recent comment, proffering advice to the Arabs generally, has made no mention of the treaty.*

A Medvedko article in PRAVDA on the 19th set the stage for further comment by expressing concern over imperialist efforts to split the Arabs, cut them off from their "sincerest allies," and weaken the progressive Arab regimes "from the inside" by helping "the forces of reaction there to take power." Medvedko assailed "reactionary quarters and certain nationalist elements" in the Arab world for trying to "blacken" Soviet-Arab friendship and promote the idea of a single Arab front "relying entirely on Arab forces." Citing the Beirut ASH-SHA'B, Medvedko warned that Arab unity cannot be achieved "by anything that harms Arab-Soviet friendship."

Taking up the theme, a Kudryavtsev article in the 21 August IZVESTIYA, as reported by TASS, acknowledged that "some or other differences" among the Arab states were unavoidable, given the "differing shades of their sociopolitical systems and political aspirations." But he advised the Arabs that their common interests "ought to be above" these differences. Kudryavtsev warned that the United States tried to make use of what it assessed as "the most vulnerable moments" in the activities and sentiments of "leading sections" in the Arab countries to depict the Soviet Union's sincere and friendly aid as "well-nigh 'Soviet expansion' and 'abuse of national sovereignty,'" in hopes of arousing nationalistic sentiments among the Arabs.

Continuing the attack, a PRAVDA article by Bolshakov on the 23d warned, according to TASS, that the U.S. Republican and Democratic election platforms' support for Israel showed "how illusory are the hopes of some Arab political leaders for 'mutual understanding' with the United States." Bolshakov also warned of the danger of insufficient unity of the Arabs in the face of a common enemy and cautioned against underestimation

* Kosygin called the Soviet-Iraqi treaty a guarantee of the continued development of friendly relations in a message on the 17th to an international conference of solidarity with Iraq held in Baghdad to support Iraq's oil nationalization decision.

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"by individual Arab leaders" of the gravity of the situation "as well as the reactionary nature of some of the monarchist regimes." Bolshakov insisted on the importance of the USSR's friendly assistance, along the lines of Medvedko's assertion that friendship with the Soviet Union is the "guarantee of success" for the Arab peoples' struggle for social and economic progress and a just peace in the Middle East.

PUBLICITY FOR ARAB REMARKS Moscow also played up Arab expressions of appreciation for the USSR's friendship and support. Thus TASS on the 22d cited the head of a visiting Syrian People's Assembly delegation as saying Syria could overcome the "intrigues of reactionaries" only with the cooperation and friendship of the Soviet Union. A similar assertion was attributed to the Cairo AL-JUMHURIYAH by TRUD on the 22d, and Moscow's domestic service on the 19th cited AL-AHRAM as calling Soviet friendship "a vitally important question" for the Arabs.

Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad was quoted by TASS on the 10th as saying, in an interview with the Beirut AL-ANWAR, that the interests of the Syrian people demanded continuation of the Soviet military experts' mission in Syria, and there was no call for a discussion of whether they should continue their mission. However, Damascus radio's account of the interview reported al-Asad as saying the question of Soviet experts in Syria was not a subject of discussion "at present." He also twice expressed the hope of Syria--and Egypt--that "the Soviet Union will meet our demands in a better and more effective way." Asked about CPSU efforts to reconcile factions of the Syrian Communist Party, al-Asad in effect warned Moscow that it had no connection with Syrian domestic affairs; professing to know nothing about Soviet conciliation efforts, he added that it was not Moscow's business to interfere in the affairs of a Syrian party and that "such an interference, if it happens, would not be in harmony with our friendship with the Soviet Union."

HUNGARIAN CRITICISM While Moscow has confined itself to oblique references to unidentified "individual Arab leaders," press comment from Budapest has been openly critical of al-Sadat. A 9 August article by Ervin Reti in ESTI HIRLAP, in an obvious reference to the Egyptian president's past proclamations that 1971 would be the year of decision, complained of "some Arab propagandists and organizations" which arouse exaggerated expectations and nourish illusions of a swift

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solution. The author added that "setting various dates and making statements not adequately thought through" may serve as shock therapy in the short term, but can also "affect matters negatively."* ESTI HIRLAP called it "simply not true" that the socialist countries could approve of the "no peace, no war" situation, but asked if that were worse than "a war which appears dangerous, uncertain, and senseless." If the Arab world were really prepared for a war which promised success, the paper added, then it would have enough strength to achieve all this without war, "with the tools of a political settlement."

The Hungarian party organ NEPSZABADSAG took a skeptical view of plans for an Egyptian-Libyan merger in an article on the 15th by Sandor Bocz which also professed alarm that "anti-Soviet tendencies" would receive a boost from the "unexpected withdrawal" of the Soviet military advisers from Egypt. Bocz noted that the Egyptian rightwing and Arab reaction in general had their hopes aroused by this development, while leftist university students openly opposed the withdrawal. The author expressed the belief that as-Sadat last spring dealt a blow, "whether he wanted to or not," to the Nasirite left in taking a position on "certain fractional struggles at that time"; now, "after tipping the political balance," he was trying to maintain national unity with his personal power and prestige.

* The Polish paper SLOWO POWSZECHNE had criticized as-Sadat in a 24 July article for repeatedly proclaiming final deadlines for an armed showdown, although "he lacked the objective data for it." Adding that "sterile breaches" of these deadlines caused successive tensions among the students and to some extent in the army, the paper said the decision to withdraw the Soviet experts should be viewed against this psychological background. If the withdrawal decision were to strengthen the government in the face of impatient elements, the paper said, then what was needed was a military feat; but the problem was that the results of such a feat might be the reverse of what was intended.

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K O R E A - U S S R

MOSCOW MUTES UNIFICATION ISSUE, MARKS KOREAN LIBERATION

Moscow has continued to show reluctance to publicize the 4 July North-South Korean joint statement on reunification, with the first available Soviet comment coming belatedly in a 10 August IZVESTIYA article.* Moscow media had duly carried the text of the 4 July statement itself, but there have been only brief Soviet reports on subsequent Korean comment and publicity, including the 19 August statement by North Korean political parties and public organizations proposing a joint conference with their counterparts in the South to implement the 4 July statement. Moscow's treatment has contrasted with that of Peking, which acclaimed the Korean joint statement authoritatively in a 9 July PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial and a major speech by Chou En-lai on the same day.

While Moscow has long been on record as supporting the goal of "peaceful unification" of Korea, its reserve toward the most dramatic development on this issue may be related to the implications for the German question, a case in which the USSR supports the maintenance of two separate states rather than their reunification. It may also be that Moscow was taken by surprise by the Korean announcement and that it sees Peking as taking over its role as Pyongyang's patron in the United Nations.

The 10 August IZVESTIYA article was pegged to support of the UNGA agenda item sponsored by a number of third-world countries, "The Creation of Conditions Promoting the Speediest Independence and Peaceful Reunification of Korea." The article brushed quickly over the content of the 4 July joint statement, noting only that the statement set forth "the basic principles of the country's unification by peaceful means and with no foreign interference" and that the North and South agreed in particular "not to allow armed conflict, to develop all-round relations, and to form a committee for a settlement between North and South."

* The joint statement and followup propaganda are discussed in the TRENDS of 6 July, pages 16-19, and of 12 July, pages 34-35.

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IZVESTIYA commented merely that this has created "new opportunities" for peaceful unification and that "the United Nations cannot remain to one side of such a favorable development of events on the Korean peninsula." The article explained, however, that the UN role in facilitating North-South contacts and negotiations for reunification is merely to "rescind the U.S. troops' right to use the UN flag," dissolve UNCURK, and withdraw foreign troops from South Korea.

LIBERATION ANNIVERSARY Moscow failed to mention the 4 July statement in comment on the 27th anniversary on 15 August of the liberation of Korea from Japanese rule, which was marked in low-key fashion, as in 1971, with the usual exchange of leaders' messages, wreath-laying ceremonies in Pyongyang, receptions hosted by the respective ambassadors, and a film show in Pyongyang. The current climate of detente in Asia and within Korea, as well as the current state of relations between Pyongyang and Moscow, seemed to be reflected in the anniversary comment. The Soviet leaders' message, saying the "fraternal friendship" of the two peoples will be developed and consolidated, expressed confidence in the growth of Soviet-Korean relations based on the principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism. Last year's message, perhaps reflecting Soviet displeasure with Kim Il-song's endorsement of the Sino-U.S. rapprochement, did not make the customary reference to Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism. Unlike past years, routine anniversary comment this year did not use the occasion to attack Peking's "splittist" policies.

The Soviet message this year inexplicably omitted the customary reference to the Soviet army's contribution to the liberation of Korea, although that fact was recalled in routine-level Moscow comment. The routine comment also recalled in the usual way that the USSR continued to give North Korea economic and technical assistance after the war, and a RED STAR article once again observed that the Soviet-DPRK treaty of friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance "protects the peaceful labor of our peoples" and helps to "insure peace and security in the Far East."

The Soviet leaders' message praised the Korean people's struggle to end the "occupation" of South Korea by U.S. troops, but Soviet comment, reflecting Moscow's detente policies as well as developments in Asia, played down the theme of alleged U.S. aggressive intent in Korea. The leaders' message failed to repeat a reference to "the aggressive, wild ambition of imperialism" which had appeared last year. Routine comment generally avoided references to U.S.

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"provocations" in Korea, although RED STAR did criticize the U.S. "militarist preparations" of maintaining troops in South Korea and modernizing the South Korean army.

Although there was no mention of the North-South Korean joint statement on reunification, Soviet comment did focus on support for the goal of "peaceful unification." Like Pyongyang, Moscow avoided the denigration of "puppet Pak Chong-hui" which had been standard fare in anniversary comment in previous years.

The greetings message from the North Korean leaders also reflected the Asian climate of detente. It failed to specify "U.S. imperialism and Japanese militarism," as it had done in previous years, when praising the friendship and cooperation of the two countries in the struggle against the "common enemy." It similarly failed to repeat last year's charge of "daily intensifying new provocative war maneuvers of U.S. imperialism and its stooges." The message praised the Soviet army in customary terms for rendering help in liberating Korea, and it reiterated the hope that the traditional friendly relations will further develop on the basis of the principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism.

In contrast to Moscow's silence on the 4 July joint statement in its anniversary comment, a NODONG SINMUN editorial on the 15 August anniversary hailed the joint statement as a "historic stage" on the road to unification. The editorial called on the "South Korean rulers" to implement the agreement and stressed a need for vigilance against U.S. "splitting maneuvers" and "the reinvasion moves of the Japanese militarists."

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AFRICA

MOSCOW REACTS CAUTIOUSLY TO UGANDA OUSTER OF ASIANS

Soviet coverage of Uganda's order expelling Asians from the country within three months has remained circumspect, apparently out of concern on Moscow's part to steer clear of any complications affecting its developing relations with the Am'n regime or its close ties with India and Bangladesh. Thus Moscow media's belated reporting of President Amin's 5 August expulsion order portrayed it as an offer of an opportunity to Asians holding British passports to leave the country. And Moscow's first comment on the episode, an article by Lesnov in IZVESTIYA on the 16th strongly supporting the Ugandan action against "British passport-holders," did not even mention the fact that Asians were involved.

Moscow's reporting did not mention that Amin on 9 August added citizens of India, Bangladesh, and Pakistan to his original expulsion order and that, in the same 9 August statement, he in effect invalidated the claim of some 23,000 Asians to Ugandan citizenship, thus swelling the ranks of those facing expulsion to some 83,000. An 8 August Moscow domestic service commentary on alleged Israeli and Western transgressions against Uganda cited only the brief passage of Amin's 5 August speech in which he assailed the activities of the British-American Tobacco Company in Uganda.

The first Soviet mention of Amin's original expulsion order was in a TASS report on the 15th which said Amin received that day the British Government's special representative, Geoffrey Rippon, "who arrived in Kampala to discuss with local authorities the question of persons of Asian origin who reside in Uganda but have British citizenship." The report went on to note offhandedly that "the Ugandan Government the other day offered those persons, of whom there are more than 50,000 in Uganda, to leave the country within three months," adding that "most of them are engaged in trade and other spheres of economic activities." The report ignored Amin's main charge that the Asians in Uganda were engaged in "economic sabotage" and "corruption."

LESNOV ARTICLE The Lesnov article in the 16 August IZVESTIYA, entitled "Threats of Colonizers," was broadcast by Radio Moscow only in English to the United Kingdom on the 16th and 17th. It observed at the outset that "Uganda has lately been

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the target of undisguised imperialist intimidation and pressure" and that "the pretext for the anti-Ugandan hysteria that has gripped Britain's ruling circles was President Idi Amin's decision to expel British passport-holders who are not citizens of the Republic from the country within three months." It added that the announced purpose of Amin's decision was "to place the economy of the country under national control and to protect it from foreign domination."

Lesnov characterized what he described as threatened "reprisals" by Foreign Secretary Douglas-Home as "surprisingly like those used by Tel Aviv's propaganda machine a few months ago, when the Israeli Embassy was asked to leave Uganda because it had engaged in subversive activities." Now as then, he continued, the West is trying to foment tribal conflicts, discredit President Amin, "and cast aspersions on the countries with which Uganda has established truly friendly relations." The article concluded that Uganda's expulsion of the Israelis, its recent warning about the activities of United States nationals, and its current "strong stand against British intimidation" show that "this newly independent country is determined to follow the road it has chosen and to conduct its internal affairs without any imperialist interference."

UGANDAN MILITARY Soviet media gave correct though not
DELEGATION IN USSR red-carpet treatment to the visit of a
 high-level Ugandan military delegation
to the USSR between 30 July and 10 August. TASS on the 31st
said the delegation, headed by acting commander of the Ugandan
Army Colonel Nyangweso, had a "friendly, businesslike" talk
that day with USSR Ground Forces Chief of Staff General Nikitin,
who gave a luncheon for the visitors attended also by Ugandan
Ambassador Ondoga.

Following an 8 August PRAVDA UKRAINY report of the delegation's
visits to Odessa and Volgograd, TASS on the 11th said Colonel
Nyangweso's delegation had returned home and reported to
President Amin that the visit had been "very useful." The
Kampala radio additionally reported enthusiastic statements
by both Nyangweso and Amin on the state of preparedness of the
Soviet armed forces, as well as a remark by Amin to the effect
that he would not reconsider his expulsion order despite what
he described as an intent by Britain to ask "some countries"
to exert pressure on him to do so.

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USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS

PARTY/GOVERNMENT DECREE TIGHTENS CONTROL OVER SCIENTISTS

Measures have been adopted to tighten control over Soviet higher educational institutions, punish dissident scientists, and intensify indoctrination of students. PRAVDA on 30 July published a joint decree of the Central Committee and Council of Ministers "On Measures to Further Improve the Country's Higher Education," which established centralized control over hiring and firing of university rectors and ordered university party organizations and social science departments to inculcate a "class approach" among students and an ability to combat anti-Marxist views. A 16 August KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA interview with the chief of the office for awarding diplomas further disclosed that the Higher Attestation Commission has adopted a new procedure to strip academic degrees and titles from persons committing "amoral, antipatriotic, and other acts incompatible with the title of scholar." This punitive innovation seems clearly aimed at scholars seeking to emigrate to Israel.

In the KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA interview, Nina Lanevich, chief of the department handling registration and awarding of diplomas and certificates of the Higher Attestation Commission under the Ministry for Higher and Secondary Specialized Education, commented on the new instructions for awarding academic titles and degrees. Noting the rapidly growing number of scientists, Lanevich explained that the July decree and the new instructions were designed to tighten the procedure for awarding degrees and indicated that the provision for stripping scientists of their titles and degrees for "amoral and antipatriotic" acts was one of only a few changes contained in the instructions. Questioning Lanevich on that point, the interviewer asked: "But were titles not taken away before for such acts?" She replied that this had occurred "extremely rarely" and explained that scholarly councils of universities followed the instructions of the Higher Attestation Commission in such cases but that these instructions did not provide for such punishment. As a result, she went on, the stripping of titles and degrees has "depended on the initiative of the scholarly councils and the administration" of each institution. The new provision will obviously encourage such action and make it more common.

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The July decree also provided for stricter controls over personnel policy. Rectors of all higher educational institutions will henceforth be appointed and removed with "consideration of the recommendation of the collegium of the USSR Higher and Secondary Specialized Education Ministry," rather than only by the ministry to which the institution is subordinated. A Council for Higher Schools under the ministry was created to work out recommendations for improving education and research and the training and use of specialists. The decree also ordered creation of local councils of rectors of higher educational institutions in educational centers.

The council established in Moscow, the most important educational center, clearly reflected the political impact of the July decree. Although the 27-member-council was headed by the rector of an institute, the roster of deputy heads notably included the head of the city party committee's science section and the deputy chairman of the city executive committee (MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA, 3 August).

SCANDAL EXPOSED IN MATSKEVICH'S AGRICULTURE MINISTRY

The position of USSR Agriculture Minister V.V. Matskevich may have been weakened by the recent arrest and public exposure of one of his top assistants. In the 2 July PRAVDA, satirist A. Sukontsev exposed V.P. Semin, deputy chief of the secretariat of the agriculture ministry, for accepting bribes--a free television set, dacha, and other items--from a Moldavian sovkhos director, and on 16 August PRAVDA reported his arrest and expulsion from the party. Sukontsev implicated the ministry's leadership by pointing out that the lax atmosphere in the ministry had permitted the flagrant abuses by Semin. Sukontsev complained that Semin had frequently asked the heads of the ministry's various administrations to perform special favors for the Moldavian sovkhos and that these officials always complied without questioning. The 16 August PRAVDA report noted Matskevich's acknowledgment of the correctness of the PRAVDA criticism and the formation of a special inspection unit within the ministry to prevent such abuses.

The scandal in Matskevich's ministry was preceded by other signs of displeasure with his leadership. Although the top command of his ministry remained virtually intact from 1966 to 1970, it has experienced extensive changes in the past two years; four new deputy ministers have been appointed since 1970, including two this spring. Moreover, the press has recently begun to urge changes in the administration of agriculture which have, by implication at least, called into question the effectiveness of Matskevich's leadership.

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